Abstract. Bounding the inefficiency of selfish routing has become an emerging research subject. A central result obtained in the literature is that the inefficiency of deterministic User Equilibrium (UE) is bounded and the bound is independent of network topology. This paper makes a contribution to the literature by bounding the inefficiency of the logit-based Stochastic User Equilibrium (SUE). In a stochastic environment there are two different definitions of system optimization: one is the traditional System Optimum (SO) which minimizes the total actual system travel time, and the other is the Stochastic System Optimum (SSO) which minimizes the total perceived travel time of all users. Thus there are two ways to define the inefficiency of SUE, i.e. to compare SUE with SO in terms of total actual system travel time, or to compare SUE with SSO in terms of total perceived travel time.
Bounding the Inefficiency of Logit-based Stochastic User Equilibrium
A common behavioral assumption in traffic network modeling is that every user chooses a route that she perceives as being the shortest under the prevailing traffic conditions. In other words, every traveler tries to minimize her own (perceived) travel time. This selfish routing assumption leads to the deterministic user equilibrium (UE) traffic assignment when users are assumed to have perfect information, or their perceived travel times are exactly their actual ones. More realistically, the perceived travel time may be considered as a random variable distributed across the population of users, i.e. each user may perceive a different travel time over the same link. Then the selfish routing assumption results in the stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) traffic assignment (Sheffi, 1985) . In contrast to uncoordinated selfish travel behaviors, system optimization is to minimize the total system travel time which measures the overall network performance under fixed demand. A system optimum (SO) flow pattern has the maximum efficiency by definition. Not surprisingly, selfish routing generally does not yield an SO flow pattern, which implies that UE and SUE are typically inefficient.
There has been an increasing interest recently in trying to quantify and bound the inefficiency of Nash equilibrium or UE in transportation context. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) proposed to analyze the inefficiency of equilibria from a worst-case perspective. The term "price of anarchy" was coined to characterize the degree of inefficiency (Papadimitriou, 2001) , which is the ratio of the worst social cost of a Nash Equilibrium to the cost of an optimal solution. Roughgarden (2003) proved that the worst-case inefficiency due to selfish routing is independent of the network topology. Several authors analyzed the bound on the inefficiency of equilibria for more general classes of cost functions and model features such as toll pricing (e.g. Chau and Sim, 2003; Correa et al, 2004; Roughgarden and Tardos, 2004; Yang et al., 2008) . Roughgarden (2005) summarized the latest developments of this research subject. Nevertheless, in the context of traffic networks, the various studies up to date focused on the case of deterministic UE, the inefficiency of SUE was, however, ignored so far.
This study is intended to make a contribution to the above emerging literature by determining the worst-case inefficiency of the logit-based SUE. The logit SUE model is an important one in transportation science that addresses suboptimal user route choices or difference in the costs perceived by different users. Before discussing the inefficiency of SUE, we should mention that there are two different system optimum definitions in a stochastic environment: one is the aforementioned conventional SO which minimizes the total actual system travel time, and the other is the stochastic system optimum (SSO) which minimizes the total perceived travel time of all users (Maher et al., 2005; Stewart, 2007) , or equivalently maximizes the net economic benefit (Yang, 1999) . As a result, there are two ways to define the inefficiency of SUE, i.e. to compare SUE with SO in terms of total actual system travel time, or to compare SUE with SSO in terms of total perceived travel time (or equivalently in term of network economic benefit). We study the inefficiency of SUE in both situations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. For completeness, Section 2 gives a brief review of bounding the inefficiency of deterministic UE. In Sections 3 and 4, we make use of the equivalent variational inequality (VI) formulation of the logit-based SUE, and compare SUE with SO and SSO, respectively, to bound its inefficiency with the two alternative definitions of total system travel time. In Section 5, we discuss the tightness of the inefficiency bounds established. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
Review of bounding the inefficiency of deterministic UE
We consider a transportation network described as a strongly connected, directed network 
The total system travel time   T v is given by
It is well known (e.g., Smith, 1979; Dafermos, 1980) 
Let so v denote the link flow solution to the SO problem, then the minimum system travel time is given by
Clearly, it holds that ue 1   . This ratio is called the inefficiency, or price of anarchy, of the selfish user equilibria (Papadimitriou, 2001 ).
The way to bound the inefficiency of UE is also used later when we analyze the SUE case.
Therefore, for completeness, a brief outline of bounding ue  is given here, based on the geometric proof due to Correa et al (2005) . 
We now consider how to upper bound the last term of the right-hand side of (9) Figure 1 , and   
Here, 0 0 0  by convention. Since 
Proof. From definitions (10) and (11), with a z replaced by ue a v , we have
which completes the proof. ♦ With Lemma 1, substituting (12) into (9) gives rise to 
Theorem 1 simply states that the upper bound,
or the worst-case inefficiency of UE is independent of the network topology but dependent on the class of cost functions only.
Bounding the inefficiency of SUE compared with SO
We now consider the case of stochastic user equilibrium. In a SUE model, each user is a utility-maximizer, and each path, r , 
This choice probability has the following properties
If the random term rw  in (15) is assumed to be normally distributed, one would obtain the probit-based route choice model. However, the probit-based model does not entail a closed-form expression of the path choice probability and thus makes our subsequent analysis of inefficiency analytically intractable. Hence we consider the logit-based route choice model only. The logit-based model assumes that the random terms of the utility functions associated with all paths are independently and identically distributed Gumbel random variables. The choice probability is then given by
and the path flow assignment is given by
It is well-known (Fisk, 1980) that the above logit-based SUE model can be formulated as the following equivalent minimization problem 
Similar to that of UE, the inefficiency of SUE compared with SO is defined as
To find an upper bound on the inefficiency of SUE (compared with SO here or compared with SSO later), we need the equivalent VI formulation for the logit-based SUE model, which is given in the following lemma. 
In view of 
With (27), we have an upper bound on the second term of the right-hand side of (25) in terms of SUE T . Now we seek an upper bound on the third term. 
and the KKT necessary conditions for the optimality of x are
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the equality constraint (29). In view of
, the optimal solution must have 0, 1, 2, , ,
, which obviously violates the optimality condition. Then the KKT conditions reduce to
Combining (33) and (34), we have
Substituting (35) into objective function (32), we have the optimal objective value
In view of   2 1 1 n x d x    , and making use of (35), we obtain 
Substituting (39) 
where
is the total traffic demand and k is the average of , 
The term 1 c  in (43) needs to be further addressed. The logit model parameter ,  in its original meaning, is inversely proportional to the standard error of the distribution of the perceived path travel times (Sheffi, 1985) , and the logit model assumes that all paths in the network has the same standard error. Specifically, 
Comparing (46) with (14), we find that the bound of sue  is generally larger than the bound of ue  , which means that the worst-case inefficiency of SUE is generally worse than that of UE. Note that this comparison is made in the respect of the worst-case inefficiency, a specific SUE can be more efficient than UE on a network. 
Bounding the inefficiency of SUE compared with SSO
In a stochastic traffic assignment environment, besides the total actual system travel time, the total perceived travel time of all users is also a useful system performance index, as it reflects the net economic benefit. For the logit-based stochastic traffic assignment model, the total perceived travel time of all users can be given in a closed-form expression as (Maher et al. 2005 )
and its opposite,   F  f , can be regarded as the net economic benefit (the direct utility corresponding to the aggregate demand minus the total travel time incurred by all users in the network) (Yang, 1999) . The stochastic system optimization (SSO) problem is to minimize the total perceived travel time (or equivalently, to maximize the net economic benefit), namely 
On the other hand, uncoordinated selfish travel behaviors of users will result in an SUE flow (54) and (55) into (53) gives the following theorem. 
Theorem 3 states that the welfare loss, SUE SSO F F  , of SUE compared with SSO is not larger than a fraction of the total actual system travel time, SUE T , under SUE. Like the deterministic UE case, the fraction or     is independent of network topology, but depends solely on the class of link cost functions.
On the tightness of the inefficiency bounds
We begin with our discussion of the tightness of the inefficiency bounds by presenting all the results in Theorems 1-3 into the following similar expressions for a comparison. 
The bound in (58) for SUE is somewhat complicated, because the system inefficiency under SUE is due to the combined effects of congestion externality and users' perception randomness, which, in general, cannot be decoupled. This also renders that it is generally difficult to find a specific instance to furnish the established upper bound in a general congested network, which requires inequality (27) and (40) to take equality simultaneously.
Nevertheless, we can shed some light on the tightness of the inefficiency bound by considering certain special cases. First, when users' perception error is zero (    or 0 0 c     , as mentioned earlier), SUE reduces to the deterministic UE and the bound (58) reduces to (57), and hence it is tight. Second, in a network without congestion or when link costs are all constants, the system inefficiency due to congestion externality becomes immaterial and the system efficiency loss is solely due to users' perception randomness. 
Figure 2. A network such that the bound in Theorem 2 is tight
We now move on to examine the tightness of the bound given in (59), which compares SUE with SSO in terms of total perceived system travel time. We give the following corollary based on Theorem 3. We conclude this section by offering a remark on the choice of the two social optimum concepts (SO and SSO) and the corresponding SUE inefficiency bounds given by (58) and (59). Clearly, choice of either one depends on the source (or the analyst's interpretation) of users' perception randomness. If users' perception randomness is due to imprecise information about the actual travel times, then the inefficiency or deviation of SUE should be measured against the deterministic SO. If, however, users' perception randomness is due to their different tastes or preferences for diversity in route choice, then SSO should be taken as the optimum criterion, because users' variety-seeking behaviors are considered as a fraction of the net economic benefit.
Conclusion
We have defined the inefficiency of SUE in two different ways, i.e. comparing SUE with SO in terms of total actual system travel time, or comparing SUE with SSO in terms of total perceived system travel time. For both notions, we provided upper bounds on the inefficiency of the logit-based SUE, based on its equivalent VI formulation and the properties of the divergence between two discrete path flow distributions.
When comparing SUE with SO in terms of total actual system travel time, the inefficiency bound of SUE depends on both the class of cost functions and the degree of perception error and the network complexity. Nevertheless, it is found that the effect of network complexity in terms of number of available paths is rather limited. Unlike the price of anarchy of the deterministic UE established in the literature, the inefficiency bounds established for the SUE is generally not tight unless either the users' perception error is zero or the network has constant link travel times.
When comparing SUE with SSO in terms of total perceived travel time (or equivalently net economic benefit), we established an upper bound on the welfare loss of SUE and found that the welfare loss is not larger than a fraction of the total actual system travel time under SUE, and the "fraction" is independent of network topology, but depends solely on the class of link cost functions. We also found that the established inefficiency bound is tight only when link costs are constants (in this case SUE coincides with SSO).
